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If a consumer buys a product which lacks any environmental
friendly characteristics, he might have a bad conscience because en-
vironmental awareness is expected from him. His environmental
attitude is inuenced by friends, parents, partners, or by the media,
but it is often not strong enough to push the market share of envi-
ronmental incompatible products towards zero and that one of the
environmentally friendly substitute towards one." (Conrad, 2005, 2)
1 Introduction
Consider a consumer willing to buy some variant of a product. She has the
choice between two variants, one at the exclusion of the other. The rst variant,
while perfectly satisfying his/her individualistic and private needs, lacks however
some environmental friendly characteristics. On the contrary, the alternative
variant, though less attractive from the consumers private and individualistic
viewpoint, by far better meets the environmental requirements of the community
in which this consumer lives. This would be the case for instance if the consumer,
fan of speediness, has to buy a car and hesitates between buying a very fast
polluting car or a car of some di¤erent brand, known for its green characteristics.
Assuming that environmental awareness in the community she lives to be very
signicant, this consumer might choose to buy this alternative brand, even if the
rst variant ts better her private" preferences: doing otherwise would entail a
social disapproval so considerable that it would enforce a reversal of her private
preferences between the two variants.
As an alternative example, consider a beverage containing some proportion
of fruit juice and alcohol. According to the period and the national community
under study, this proportion can vary between 0 and 100%. For instance, at the
Prohibition time, it had to be equal to 0 while, in Western countries today, no
explicit constraint exists concerning the level of this ratio. Nevertheless, for road
security reasons, most regions have adopted several rules limiting the quantity
of alcohol allowed in the driversblood, with huge nes to be paid by them when
the edict is openly violated. These rules not only enhance the rise of an anti-
alcohol social norm in the society, but they give rise to an objective punishment,
should the drivers not comply with the rule. A driver who likes alcohol might
privately prefer to drink a variant of this beverage containing a higher proportion
of alcohol than fruit juice. However, the fear of the ne punishment might induce
her to reverse her private preference, and rather consume a lighter drink with
more fruit juice and less alcohol.
Also consider the market for lemons versus for new cars. There are at least
three reasons why the Society prefers the number of new cars to be increased
while simultaneously the supply of available lemons to be decreased. First,
increasing the number of new cars increases demand on the labour market de-
creasing thereby unemployment. On the other hand, decreasing the number of
lemons increases the average security on the roads since there are less car ac-
cidents implying new cars than lemons. Finally, new cars are less polluting
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than lemons. These are the reasons why the French Government had recently
edicted the so-called prime à la casse". According to this rule, the driver of
a lemon buying a new car obtains from the Government a lump-sum subsidy if
he/she buys a new car and let the lemon to be destroyed. Such a rule indirectly
subsidizes the variant new car" and constitutes an indirect penalty against
the lemons. Similarly, the subsidy provided by the government to consumers
buying solar panels might well distort their private preferences with respect to
alternative forms of energy, like electricity or gaz.
A last example is the attitude of tobacco fans with respect to cigarettes
consumption.Thirty years ago, it was fashionable to smoke cigarettes since most
of the movies stars were hard smokers or, at least, behaved as if they would be.
In the meantime, the disastrous e¤ects of tobacco on health were extensively
documented and an anti tobacco social norm developed, leading for instance to
the interdiction of smoking into public buildings, with a ne to be perceived in
case of breach.
All the above examples and comments reveal that, when making their shop-
ping decisions, consumers are not only interested in meeting their private needs,
but also guided in their choice by the degree to which their choice complies with
some social norm. Furthermore, consuming a variant obeying a weak compliance
with the norm can generate a social punishment, while a stronger one a social
reward. In the words of Jon Elster (Elster, 1989, 99), for norms to be social,
they must be shared by other people and partly sustained by their approval and
disapproval. They are also sustained by the feelings of embarrassment, anxiety,
guilt and shame that a person su¤ers at the prospect of violating them".
The duopoly theory developed hereafter is based on the judgement that, in
some cases, human actions are typically guided both by individual rationality
and by social norms. Also it assumes that the variants of some good are re-
ecting more or less adequately the social driving force lying behind the norm.
Consider a market with two di¤erent variants of a good embodying some char-
acteristics complying more or less with a social norm, like a beverage containing
more or less alcohol, or a car and its green and brown variants. In this sit-
uation, the shopping decision cannot be viewed as if the level of compliance
of the variants with the norm would not play a role in the choice of the con-
sumer: it would deny the right for the consumer to be guided by the importance
she pays to her others regarding preferences via her appliance with the social
norm. Accordingly, we propose in the following to incorporate in the utility
function of the consumer a new term depending, for each variant, on the level
of its compliance with the social norm. Furthermore, we introduce the idea of
social reward" and punishment" by assuming that the utility for a specic
variant does not depend only on its own level of compliance with the norm, but
also on the social reward-punishment di¤erential: the larger this di¤erential,
the higher the di¤erence between the reward when buying the most complying
variant and the punishment when buying the other one. Incorporating these
new ingredients into the model of course a¤ects the demand functions of the
rms, whatever the level of compliance of their variants with the social norm.
Finally, we assume that the rms are able to select this level of compliance in
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some domain. The decisions about prices and variants are taken sequentially,
rst price level of compliance and then price, and we examine the properties of
the subgame perfect equilibrium of this sequential game.
Our ndings are as follows. According to the relative importance consumers
pay to the compliance of the variants with the social norm, either both rms
are active in the market at positive equilibrium prices, or only the one with
the highest level of compliance is active, the rival rm being excluded from
the market. The smaller the social reward-punishment di¤erential between the
variants, the higher the chance to observe two variants at equilibrium. On the
contrary, when this di¤erential is large, only the variant with the higher level
of compliance can survive at equilibrium. In this case, two subcases must be
distinguished. In the rst, the owner of this variant behaves as a monopolist, but
it must set a price su¢ ciently low to keep the rival rm out of the market. In the
other one, when the social reward di¤erential is su¢ ciently large, the rival can no
longer threaten the monopolist to enter the market. Then, it is optimal for the
monopolist to quote the pure monopoly price. Finally the levels of compliance
are fully determined in the rst stage of the game. When both rms are active
at equilibrium prices corresponding to the top level of compliance, the rm with
the higher level of compliance chooses precisely this top level while the low level
of compliance rm chooses a strictly smaller level of compliance than the top
one. Nevertheless, the higher the threat of punishment, the more compliant the
choice of the latter.
The model explored in this paper shares several features with the traditional
vertical product di¤erentiation model (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979). Never-
theless, the introduction of others regarding preferences", via the existence of a
social norm, considerably alters the predictions of the latter. The di¤erences and
similarities between the two models and their predictions will be systematically
pointed out along the equilibrium analysis.
A striking example of goods subject to the existence of a social norm are
environmental products. It is not surprising that applying our results to envi-
ronmental economics, leads to derive interesting insights in this specic eld.
Although recently an increasing attention has been devoted to the impact of
environmental awareness on market equilibrium (Conrad 2005, Eriksson 2004,
Moraga-Gonzales and Padròn-Fumero 2002, Rodriguez-Ibeas 2007 inter alia),
to the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to explore the policy implications
of green consumerism while nesting the social concern of consumers into the
literature on environment. Moreover, as it will be shown later, our approach
displays some properties directly comparable with those emerging in models on
the end-of-pipe approach1. Thus, our paper opens the door to a clear comparison
between measures based on green consumerism and the traditional environmen-
tal regulation.
In the next section we present the formal model. Then we proceed with the
equilibrium analysis in section 3. We end up with a short conclusion.
4
2 The model
Consider two variants of the same product, A and B, and some social norm
developed in a community whose members are identied by the interval [0; ] ;
0 < . We say that variant A ts better the social norm than variant B if
everybody in this community feels that consuming variant A complies better
with the norm than variant B: Thus, assume, indeed, that variant A ts better
the social norm than variant B: Firm A (resp. rm B) produces variant A (resp.
variant B) at no cost2.
Let A (resp. vB) with  2 [0; ] be a component of the satisfaction -we
call it the individual - social concern for product A- obtained by consumer 
when consuming one unit of variant A (resp. B): , A (resp. vB) represents
for all consumers the rate at which variant A (resp. B) ts the social norm, or
its level of compliance, so that A > B . All consumers agree on the levels of
compliance A and B but we assume them to be ranked in the domain [0; ]
according to the size of their social awareness. This introduces heterogeneity in
the population since all individuals are not uniformly concerned with the social
norm: the closer to 0, the weaker the social awareness of individual  in the
community:
Furthermore, we assume that consuming variant A rather than variant B
also a¤ects the satisfaction of the consumer because consuming a variant better
complying with the social norm generates a socially worthy identity, transformed
in turn into a social reward3. Conversely, consuming a variant less complying
with the social norm generates a feeling of social disapproval transformed in
turn into a social punishment4. An immediate byproduct of the above is that
the benet from consuming variant A rather than variant B is higher, the larger
the di¤erence between A and B : In the following, we call this di¤erence the
reward-punishment di¤erential. Thus, we add to the utility A another term
measuring the social benet (reward) of consuming one unit of variant A rather
than variant B; namely (A   B): Symmetrically, to the utility vB ; we add
the term (B   A) to capture the frustration (punishment) incurred by the
consumer when she consumes one unit of variant B rather than A: Finally, the
utility for consumer  when choosing variant A (resp. B) writes as
VA() =

A + (A   B) if she chooses variant A;
0 otherwise.
;
(resp.
VB() =

vB + (B   A) if she chooses variant B;
0 otherwise
):
It is assumed that
0 <     ;
with ;  2]0; 1]:
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When there exist markets on which the two variants can be exchanged
against money, at unit prices pi; i = A;B; the utility after purchasing vari-
ant A (resp. B) is given by UA() = VA()  pA (resp. UB() = VB()  pB).
Finally we assume that the level of compliance is chosen by the rms in
some domain [; ] : there exists a lowest level of compliance  such that, if the
proposed variant would not meet this level, the social norm would be violated.
On the contrary, there exists a highest level of compliance  guaranteeing that
the social norm is fully satised.
3 Equilibrium analysis
We consider a two-stage game. In the rst stage, rms have to decide the extent
to which their variant complies with the social norm, namely, vi; i = A;B. In
the second stage of the game, each rm chooses its price pi; i = A;B.
The game is solved by backward induction. Assuming that rms rst choose
the level of compliance i; i = A;B; in the domain [; ] and then their price, we
determine rst the demand for each rm as a function of pi and i, for i = A;B.
Then, we determine the price equilibrium for given levels of compliance and,
nally, we identify the optimal level of compliance.
Traditionally, when deciding whether purchasing a good, a consumer takes
into account the benet deriving from the intrinsic characteristics of the good
and the price at which it is sold. As we have just seen, the existence of a social
norm introduces further ingredients into her decision process. In particular,
when an individual takes into consideration the consequences in terms of social
reward and punishment, deriving from a specic purchase, a variant which would
not be a priori considered in the shopping list, can be bought for its social value.
In order to embed these ingredients in our formal analysis, we dene hereafter
both the marginal consumer ^(pA ; pB ) indi¤erent between buying variant B
or variant A at prices pA and pB;; (solution of the equation VA()   pA =
VB()  pB ); namely:
^(pA ; pB ) =
pA   pB
A   B   (+ ) ;
as well as the consumer i(pi) who is indi¤erent between buying product i and
not buying at all (solution of the equation Ui(i; pi) = 0). Accordingly, we
write:
B(pB) =
pB +  (A   B)
B
(> 0)
and, in the same way,
A(pA) =
pA    (A   B)
A
> 0 if pA >  (A   B) :
From the above denitions, we provide in appendix 1 the demand functions
faced by Firm B and Firm A; respectively, namely
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DB =
8<:   B(pB) i¤ B(pB) <  < ^(pA ; pB )^(pA ; pB )  B(pB) i¤ B(pB)  ^(pA ; pB )  
0 i¤ ^(pA ; pB ) < A(pA ; pB ) < 
and
DA =
8<:   A(pA ; pB ) i¤ ^(pA ; pB ) < A(pA ; pB ) <   ^(pA ; pB ) i¤ B(pA ; pB )  ^(pA ; pB )  
0 i¤ B(pA ; pB ) <  < ^(pA ; pB )
Notice that, in the case B(pA ; pB ) <  < ^(pA ; pB ); the demand function
for rm B turns out to be    B(pA ; pB ) > 0, while that for rm A is
zero. Thus, it is immediate to conclude that in this range of  parameters,
rm B monopolizes the market, while rm A is inactive. By the same token,
rm A monopolizes the market whenever ^(pA ; pB ) < A(pA ; pB ) < ; rm
B being inactive in this range of  parameters. Finally, in the case when
B(pA ; pB )  ^(pA ; pB )  ; rm A and rm B share the market.
We start now solving the game. To this end, we move to the analysis of the
second stage where price competition between rms takes place, assuming that
the level of compliance has been chosen by each rm at the rst stage.
3.1 The second stage game: choosing the price
Let i be the prot function of rm i; i = A;B; dened by
i(i; pi; j ; pj) = piDi(pi; pj):
In order to identify the equilibrium prices, we rst dene the best reply functions
of Firm A and Firm B5.
We nd that the prices observed at equilibrium crucially depend on the
ratio AB : According as the value of this ratio is smaller or larger than H1; with
H1 =
( +)
2 ; the corresponding equilibrium prices lead to two di¤erent market
structures6. In the rst, observed when AB  H1; both rms are active in the
market and equilibrium prices pA and p

B are positive and given by:(
pA = ((2+ ) A   B) 2A(A B)4A B
pB = ((   + ) B   2A) (A B)4A B :
Notice that the condition AB  H1 cannot be met without the inequality
H1 > 1 to be met, implying  >  +  from the very denition of H1. The
larger ; the more signicant the heterogeneity among consumers and the larger
the domain of (; ) values satisfying the condition  >  + : Thus, the
market can sustain both variants if (i) the heterogeneity among consumers ()
is su¢ ciently large and/or (ii) the role of punishment and reward on consumers
decisions is not too signicant.
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The equilibrium prices identied above are exactly those which would obtain
in a vertical product di¤erentiation model if the reward-punishment di¤erential
would not play any role. Using the interpretation of the reward-punishment
di¤erential as a di¤erence between a subsidy and a tax rate on the two variants,
we see that the existence of this subsidy and tax increases (resp. decreases) the
equilibrium price pA (resp. p

B) compared with the equilibrium values observed
in the traditional vertical di¤erentiation model with an uncovered market. The
rationale behind this nding is that the reward-punishment di¤erential strength-
ens the traditional market power of rm A, while weakening that of its rival rm
B.
By contrast to the above analysis, rm A evicts rm B from the market in
the case when AB > H1: Indeed, variant A is so signicantly complying with
the consumption norm (compared with variant B), that no consumer is willing
to buy variant B; whatever its price. In this latter case, the equilibrium prices
of rms A and B are given, respectively, by(
p+A =
(A B)(A+B)
B
p+B = 0
if AB  H2
p

A =
1
2 (A +  (A   B))
p

B = [0; y]
if AB > H2;
with H2 =
 +2+
p
2+2+42 2+4+4
4 . Thus, when
A
B
 H2 and the
reward-punishment di¤erential does not exist, the equilibrium price p+A coincides
with the so called limit price" arising in a vertical product di¤erentiation model
when the high quality rm drives the low quality one out of the market at
equilibrium7. In this case, the equilibrium price p+A turns out to be higher, the
higher : Indeed, a high value of  magnies the role of social punishment,
thereby reducing ceteris paribus the benet coming from purchasing variant B:
As a consequence, rm A can keep out from the market the competitor at a
relatively higher equilibrium price p+A; compared with a scenario with a weaker
punishment incurred by consumers when buying variant B:
Accordingly, when the inequality AB  H2 holds, rm B; in spite of being
inactive in the market, still a¤ects the equilibrium outcome. On the contrary,
when AB > H2; the monopolist A is a true" monopolist to the extent that his
rival can no longer a¤ect the equilibrium. By the way, it is easy to check that
the price p

A is the pure monopoly price corresponding to the situation where
rm B would simply not exist. In this case8, one can see that the resulting
market share DA

= (A+(A B))2A ; when assuming  = 0; coincides with
that observed in the true" monopoly case:
We can summarize the above ndings as follows.
Proposition 1 At the subgame price equilibrium, depending on the value of
the ratio AB , either both rms are active in the market at positive equilibrium
prices ( AB  H1), or only the rm endowed with the higher level of compliance
is active, the rival rm being excluded ( AB > H1).
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Observe that, when AB  H2 , the monopolist optimal price is the limit price
p+A: this price, with p
+
A < p

A; is set su¢ ciently low to keep the rival B out of
the market. On the contrary, when AB > H2; in spite of the fact that rm B
can no longer credibly threaten the monopolist; it is optimal for the latter to
quote a rather low price (the pure monopoly price) so as to serve a large set of
consumers which otherwise would refrain from buying. We conclude that:
Corollary 2 When the market is monopolized by rm A, its optimal price is
given by min

p+A; p

A

:
3.2 The rst stage game: choosing the level of compliance
Let us consider now the rst stage of the game when the rms choose their
level of compliance i; in the domain[; ] ; i = A;B. First, notice that, in the
subdomain corresponding to AB  H1; the prot function of rm A is increasing
in A: Consequently, in the domain of vA values satisfying AB  H1; the best
reply 'A (B) remains constant and equal to :When H1 <
A
B
 H2; the same
property holds because rmA prot function is also monotonically increasing
in vA so that in this domain  remains the best reply of A. Finally, when
H2 <
A
B
; there is no longer a game between rms A and B since the former is a
pure monopolist and, in this case, it chooses the pure monopoly price. It is easy
to show that the corresponding prot function is also monotonically increasing
in vA: In conclusion, the best reply function of rm A with respect to the choice
of vA is constant in the whole domain [; ] :
Regarding rm B, in the domain where she is active, namely AB  H1, her
best reply function B (A) obtains as:
B (A) = A;
with  =

2 2 +
p
(2 2+)(2 2+25)

7 7+3 < 1: Thus
Proposition 3 When the reward-punishment di¤erential is small, the levels of
compliance corresponding to the Nash equilibrium are given by (; ) : When
this di¤erential is large, rm B is inactive, and rm A selects :
It is worth noticing that this result is not in line with the traditional nd-
ings in vertical di¤erentiation. Indeed, in vertical di¤erentiation models, the
low quality rm can be inactive under particular conditions on the models pa-
rameters only if the market is covered, with all consumers buying some variant.
Then, a niteness property holds, according to which a single rm only can sur-
vive at equilibrium (see Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980)) On the contrary, when
the market is uncovered, the niteness property does not apply. Due to the
social norm, the rm with the lower level of compliance is kept out from the
market even when the latter is uncovered, as it is the case both under limit
pricing or pure monopoly.
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It is easy to see that, when  =  = 0;the model considered above boils down
to the usual model of vertical product di¤erentiation studied by Gabszewicz and
Thisse (1979).
Finally, evaluating the derivative @B@ in the subdomain dened by the con-
dition AB  H1 (see appendix 4), we get
Proposition 4 The compliance level increases with :
Accordingly , the parameter  can be viewed as an incentive for the less
complying rm B to increase its level of compliance. When  increases, the
punishment for deviating from the social norm becomes more and more inuen-
tial on the consumers decision. At some point, namely, when  becomes so high
that the condition  >  +  is violated (thereby implying that the inequality
A
B
 H1 no longer holds), then the less complying rm is driven out of the
market: all consumers feel that it sells a variant insu¢ ciently complying with
the social norm.
4 An application to environmental economics
As stated in the introduction, environmental economics constitutes a natural
eld for applying the above results. In this interpretation, the variant with the
higher degree of compliance should be viewed as a "green" product, the "brown"
one being identied with the rm showing the lowest level of compliance with
the environmental norm. In this strand of literature, the core question is to
identify means for reducing pollution damage at the international level. In Eu-
rope, the environmental policy is identied by the EU Emission Trading Scheme.
Launched in 2005, this scheme is mainly based on a cap and trade" principle:
a cap denes the total amount of greenhouse gases that can be emitted by
producers. Nevertheless, this approach has been questioned, as unilateral envi-
ronmental policies can drive out rms to countries with less stringent regulation
(the so called pollution havens) or,on the contrary, incite these countries to use
environmental dumping to attract FDI.
Our analysis reveals that there exist alternative ways, based on prot-driven
mechanisms, to sustain green production, with positive e¤ects on pollution
abatement. Assuming that the pollution damage decreases with the level of
compliance, our results can be interpreted as follows. First, whatever the equi-
librium market conguration, a pollution abatement is driven by the existence
of others regarding preferences, compared with the situation when consumers
behavior would be only shaped by individual rationality. In the case when both
rms are active at equilibrium, the compliance level selected by both rms is
higher than it would be without such preferences while the market share of the
brown variant shrinks. As for the monopoly case, the pollution abatement fol-
lows directly from the fact that the brown variant must simply disappear from
the market.
Furthermore, the above pollution abatement is a direct consequence of the
market mechanism, and not following from an explicit environmental policy.
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Thanks to this, it escapes the carbon leakage phenomenon taking place when
an explicit unilateral abatement policy is introduced, inducing polluting rms
to relocate in pollution havens with less stringent regulation (see on this Sanna
Randaccio and Sestini, 2012). Indeed, the brown rm of our model is prevented
to relocate in a pollution haven while selling her variant in the home market:
no consumer would be interested in buying this variant due to its too low level
of compliance with the social norm.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we explore how duopoly market competition values the variants
of a product, when these variants embody at di¤erent levels the requirements
derived from some social norm. Introducing a model in which preferences of
consumers depend partially on the levels of compliance of the variants with
the social norm, we characterize the equilibrium path along which rms choose
sequentially their level of compliance and their price. We conclude that the
dependance of preferences on the level of compliance exerts a benecial e¤ect
on the choice of variants by rms. In particular, when interpreting these results
in the framework of environmental concernment, they reveal the existence of
a pollution abatement obtained independently from any explicit environmental
policy.
While economists generally adopt a methodological position of strict indi-
vidualism when depicting consumersbehavior, one must recognize that often
consumersdecisions are signicantly inuenced by their social environment and
the set of values that it conveys. Of course this recognition does not simplify the
analysis of market behavior because it introduces externalities in the preferences
of individuals. Nevertheless, it seems useless to get around this di¢ culty: more
and more frequently, consumption decisions involve elements borrowed from the
social sphere of individuals. Think of tobacco, drugs, brown products, arms and
other goods, viewed as nuisances by a majority of the community in which con-
sumers are immersed. The present paper is an essay to explore this world using
the traditional tools of economic analysis.
6 Appendix
6.1 Appendix 1
First, notice that (^  B) and (^  A) had the same sign as (A   B).
Let us denote by pB = B    (A   B) ; the reservation price of the
variant B for the consumer  such that for any pB > pB ; no consumer is willing
to buy variant B: Then, let us denote by pBB = pA   ( + (+ )) (A   B)
given pA; the value of price pB corresponding to which consumer  is indi¤erent
from buying variant A or variant B: Finally, let us denote by pB = BA pH  
(A   B) A+BA the value of price pB such that for any pB  pB ; ^ 
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. Symmetrically, we denote pA = A +  (A   B) as the price pA such
that no consumer is willing to buy variant A for pA > pA; and pA = AB pB +
(A   B) A+BB the value of price pA such that for any pA  pA; L  ^  :
Finally, let pBA = ( + (+ )) (A   B) + pB be value of pA corresponding to
which  is indi¤erent from buying variant A or variant B; given pB :
Thus, we can split each demand functions into two separate functions as
follows.
If pA  A +  (A   B) ; then rms B demand function writes as
DB =

   pB+(A B)B if pB  pB
0 if pB  pB
;
while, if pA  A +  (A   B)
DB =
8><>:
   pB+(A B)B if pB  pBB
pA pB
A B   (+ ) 
pB+(A B)
B
if pBB  pB  pB
0 if pB  pB :
;
Furthermore,
minfpB ; pBBg =

pB if H  
pBB if H  : :
Indeed, the inequality pB  pBB implies that pA  A +  (A   B) or
  H , so thay DA = 0. Thus, rm B may obtain the whole demand of the
market or be inactive according to the position of B w.r.t . In particular,
DB =    L; if B < ; while DB = 0 if B  .
Moving to rms A demand function:
if pB  B    (A   B) ; then it writes as
DA =

   pA (A B)A if pA  pA
0 if pA  pA
while if pB  B    (A   B) ;
DA =
8><>:
   pA (A B)A if pA  pA
  

pA pB
A B   (+ )

if pA  pA  pBA
0 if pA  pBA :
Since,
minfpA; pAg =

A +  (A   B) if B  
A
B
pB + (A   B) A+BB if B  
as the inequality pA  pA implies pB  B    (A   B) or   pBB +
(A B)
B
= B , so that DL = 0. Thus Firm A obtains the whole demand of
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the market or be inactive according to the position of A w.r.t . In particular,
DA =    A, if A < ; while DA = 0 if A  .
Summarizing the above ndings allows to write the following demand func-
tions:
DB =
8><>:
   pB+(A B)B if pB  minfpB ; pBBg
pA pB
A B   (+ ) 
pB+(A B)
B
if pBB  pB  pB
0 if pB  pB
DA =
8><>:
   pA (A B)A if pA  minfpA; pAg
  

pA pB
A B   (+ )

if pA  pA  pBA
0 if pA  pBA
Appendix 2
Best reply functions of rm B in the price game:
It derives from the demand functions that:
 Whenever pA  pA, namely    A < 0; then
B =
(
pB

   pB+(A B)B

if pB  pB
0 if pB  pB :
From the F.O.C, one can immediately write the best reply function 'L (pA):
'B (pA) =

1
2 (B    (A   B)) if pB > 0
[0; y] if pB  0
 On the contrary, if pA  pA, namely    A > 0; then prot functions for
Firm B turn out to be:
B =
8><>:
pB

   pB+(A B)
B

if pB  pBB
pB

pA pB
A B   (+ ) 
pB+(A B)
B

if pBB  pB  p^B
0 if pB  p^B
The F.O.C imply:(
pB =
1
2
(B    (A   B)) if pB  pBB
pB =
1
2A
(pAB   (A   B) (A + B)) if pBB  pB  p^B
1. If pB  0 then p^B < ~pB < 0. Thus, rm Bs prot is equal to 0 for
all pB 2 [0; y] and
'B (pA) = [0; y], 8pA
2. If pB > 0 then:
(a) whenever ~pB  pBB ;then 'B (pA) = ~pB
(b) whenever p^B  maxf0; pBBg; then 'B (pA) = p^B
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(c) whenever 0  p^B  pBB  ~pB ; then 'B (pA) = pBB
(d) whenever p^B  0, then the prot is equal to 0 and 'B (pA) =
[0; y]:
Notice that S.O.C are always satised.
Best Reply function of rm A in the price game:
Applying the same rationale as above, one can derive that:
 If pB  pB ,
H =
(
pA

   pA (A B)A

if pA < pA
0 if pA  pA
From the F.O.C, it derives that the best reply function is:
'A (pB) =
1
2A

 +  1A (A   B)

if pA > 0:
We easily check that S.O.C are satised.
 Otherwise, if pB  pB ; then prot function writes as:
H =
8><>:
pA

   pA (A B)
A

if pA  pA
pA

  

pA pB
A B   (+ )

if pA  pA  pBA
0 if pA  pBA
F.O.C. imply that:8<: ~pA =
1
2
A

 +  1
A
(A   B)

if pA  pA
p^A =

 + (+ ) + pB
A B
  
1
2
(A   B)

if pA  pA  pBA
We check by a simple computation that S.O.C satised. So,
1. whenever ~pA < pA, or pB >
(AB (A B)(2A+B))
2A
, then 'A (pB) =
~pA;
2. whenever pA  p^A  pBA , or pB < (B 2A B+B)(A B)(2A B) , then
'A (pB) = p^A.
3. whenever p^A < pA; or
(B 2A B+B)(A B)
(2A B)  pB 
(AB (A B)(2A+B))
2A
, then
'A (pB) = pA.
Appendix 3
Three cases have to be distinguished for the best reply function of Firm A at
the second stage according to the sign of the thresholds of its denition domain,
namely the sign of (AB (A B)(2A+B))2A and
(B 2A B+B)(A B)
(2A B) :
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To this aim, notice that
(B   2A   B + B) (A   B)
(2A   B) > 0,
A
B
< H1;
with H1 =
( +)
2 ; while
(AB   (A   B) (2A + B))
2A
> 0, A
B
< H2;
with H2 =
 +2+
p
2+2+42 2+4+4
4 :
This implies that there are four cases of intersection between the best reply
functions of both rms:
 Case 1: AB < H1;
 Case 2: H1  AB < H2;
 Case 3: H2  AB 
(+)
 ;
 Case 4: AB >
(+)
 .
These four cases are depicted in Figure 1. Notice from the gure, that cases
3 and 4 can be combined because they lead to the same set of price equilibria.
In Case 1, rms A and B share the market, thereby both being active at some
positive equilibrium prices; in the two remaining case only rm A can be active
in the market at some positive equilibrium price.
6.2 Appendix 4
Proof of Proposition 4.
First, notice that, the di¤erence between the equilibrium A   B writes
5  5+ 4  
p
52   8  52 + 42 + 42 + 252

(7  7+ 3) :
In order to prove the statement in the Proposition 4, it su¢ ces to show that
@
@ (A   B) < 0: Indeed, given that A = ; the di¤erence (A(= )  B) can
decrease i¤ B raises: The derivative of the above expression w.r.t. , namely
@
@ (A   B) ; boils into
170  170  97 + 13
p
52   8  52 + 42 + 42 + 252

(7  7+ 3)2
p
52   8  52 + 42 + 42 + 252
 (  ) :
While both terms at the denominator are positive, the term at the numerator is
negative. So, we can conclude that this derivative is negative, meaning that the
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higher  the lower the (A   B), or in other words (given A = ); the higher
 the higher B : Q.E.D.
FOOTNOTES
1. Typically, the end-of pipe technologies allows to reduce pollution emissions
by implementing add-on measures rather than using cleaner inputs or
production process (Copeland and Taylor, 1994).
2. This assumption is a little awkward because one can imagine that a more
compliant variant should entail some costly investments not obligatory
when the compliance of the variant is a less important variable. However,
if these investmentscosts are xed , they would not alter the following
analysis. This assumption is introduced for simplicity.
3. This social reward can sometimes assume the shape of a subsidy, as in the
example of the solar panels above.
4. This social punishment may sometimes assume the shape of a tax or a
ne, like in the example of the car drivers above.
5. Details on these functions are provided in Appendix 2.
6. See Appendix 3 for details.
7. Notice however that, contrary to the limit pricing strategy used by the high
quality rm in a vertically di¤erentiated market, the limit price strategy
used here by rm A does not imply that the market is covered.
8. Notice that market share corresponding to the monopoly case when a limit
price is quoted denes as DA+ =
(B (A B))
B
:
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